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a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through
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oped economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition
resulting from more international nancial openness induces banks to take excessive
risks. We nd however that sufciently high nancial openness is necessary for a posi-
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1 Introduction
Efcient risk management in the banking sector is crucial for emerging economies.1 Because
of their highly uncertain environment, these countries are prone to information problems that
can cause excessive risk-taking behavior in the banking industry (Vives, 2006). This situ-
ation is further aggravated by the minimal development of their nancial markets, which
increases the role of banks. The intent of emerging countries to comply with advanced
risk management procedures is nevertheless quite remarkable2. In 2009, 14 countries, some
of which were large emerging countries, became members of the Basel Committee. Ac-
cording to many authors (Powell 2002, Fischer 2002, Llewellyn 2003, Balin 2008), how-
ever, the banking systems in emerging economies can face difculties when adopting the
sophisticated approaches initially that are intended, at least initally, for advanced economies.
These authors highlight the structural weaknesses of the nancial environment in emerging
economies as captured by the low quality of accountancy data, a lack of auditing agencies,
problems in accounting and auditing procedures and problems in implementing sophisti-
cated risk measurement systems. Among emerging economies, the MENA (Middle East and
Northern Africa) countries and Turkey are particularly interesting. Banking sectors in the
MENA region are among the deepest in the emerging and developing world3. These sectors
have undergone a profound transformation through a privatization process and the entry of
foreign institutions, but some of them are still in the early stages of nancial development
and have a weak legal and supervisory environment (Anzoategui et al. 2010, Cigogna 2009).
In a recent study of the banking sectors in the MENA region, Turk-Ariss (2009, p. 694)
notes, "Monetary authorities in MENA countries generally require banks to adopt interna-
tional accounting standards and to comply with international regulatory requirements." The
stability of the banking sectors in this region is viewed as a condition of the attractiveness of
1In this paper, the term "emerging economies" does not refer to a specic list of countries. Each international
organization or rating agency uses its own classication. Due to the lack of a precise denition, we consider
emerging economies to be developing countries that are not part of the "Least Developed Countries" group. Our
model is adapted to economies characterized by increasing nancial integration as well as by a weak nancial
environment and capital ight.
2The 2008 FSI survey (FSI-BIS 2008, p. 2) indicates that 92 non-members of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision have implemented or are currently planning to implement Basel II. Moreover, 61 % of
these non-members intend to offer the Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach (Advanced IRB).
3The MENA region ranks second (behind East Asia) in banking sector development, according to the ratio
of bank assets to GDP and the level of banking sector credit offered to the private sector as a ratio of GDP over
the period 2002-2008 (Anzoategui et al., 2010).
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oil surplus funds.
In this paper, we analyze how international competition for deposits can prevent ex-
cessive bank risk-taking in emerging economies. In particular, we model pressure on the
emerging banking system from possible capital outows to a developed nancial center. The
quality of the nancial environment is addressed by introducing the notion of transparency,
dened as the ability of depositors to observe how prudently banks behave.
Our approach is motivated by an increasing degree of openness in emerging economies
towards OECD countries. A higher level of openness translates into higher levels of capital
mobility. It follows that banks must compete with those in developed countries to keep their
depositors domestic4. For example, the Swiss private banking industry intends to attract a
share of the increasing capital ows from the Middle-East, more than 50% of which are
already managed by international banking centers5. Capital ight, which is particularly high
from resource-based MENA economies (Almansour 2008), can furthermore be viewed as
international competition for deposits. Among the various determinants of capital ight,
there is evidence of a lack of condence in the banking systems of East Asian economies or
of countries such as Russia (Collier et al. 1999, Loungani and Mauro 2000, Perotti 2002),
which have been hit by nancial distress.
In this paper, we consider international banking competition as a disciplinary device.
Depositors can exert pressure on home banks by reallocating their savings to an external
(i.e., foreign) banking system that is more protective. The disciplinary role of depositors
on banks has been studied by Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Allen and Gale (1999), Chen
(1999) and, from a critical point of view, Hellwig (2005). The existing literature argues
that depositors can punish banks by withdrawing their funds when they do not approve of
the bank's behavior. This means of exerting discipline through the depositors' behavior
is well documented empirically in emerging economies. These studies test the reaction of
the depositors to high risk-taking on the banks' part by analyzing changes in the volume
of deposits and the corresponding interest rates. In Latin America, empirical evidence has
been found by Barajas and Steiner (2000) for Colombia, by Calomiris and Powell (2001) for
Argentina, and by Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) for Argentina, Mexico, and Chile.
4The increasing nancial openness of emerging economies and its consequences have been well measured
by Prasard et al. (2003). With the exception of FDIs, capital has tended to ow from poor to rich countries
during the 2000s (Prasad et al. 2006).
5Swiss Bankers Association and Boston Consulting Group, Banking im Wandel-Zukunftsperspektiven für
Banken in der Schweiz, Sept 2011.
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More recently, Ungan et al. (2008) have shown that deposits signicantly increase with the
improvement of capital and liquidity ratios in Russia. Similar evidence has also been found
by Onder and Ozyildirim (2008) for Turkey.
It is generally argued that the effectiveness of this disciplining behavior crucially depends
on the transparency of the banking system. It has also been suggested that bank regulation
should impose greater transparency to mitigate moral hazards and reduce risk-taking (Bhat-
tacharya, Boot and Thakor, 1998; Boot and Thakor, 2001; Admati and Peiderer, 2000;
Cordella and Yeyati, 2002). Our paper specically studies the interaction between trans-
parency in bank risk-taking and the disciplinary role of depositors.
The main theoretical results of this paper can be summarized as follows. In our model,
which has been adapted to emerging countries, we obtain a classical result according to
which the increased competition that results from more international nancial openness in-
duces banks to take excessive risks. We nd, however, that sufciently high nancial open-
ness is necessary to achieve a positive link between nancial transparency and safe risk
management. In fact, augmenting transparency has an ambiguous effect. On the one hand,
it makes banks more attractive to depositors due to higher information disclosure, but on
the other hand it spurs competition and reduces bank protability. When there is a high de-
gree of nancial openness, prot margins are relatively low and strong nancial disclosure
leads to weak losses. It then follows that the attractiveness effect of transparency dominates,
which encourages banks to adopt safe risk management policies. The implication from the
policy analysis perspectiven is that promoting successful nancial disclosure in an emerging
country requires sufcient nancial openness.
The theoretical literature that is closest to our model is Cordella and Yeyati (2002) and
Hyytinen and Takalo (2002).
Cordella and Yeyati (2002) develop a model of spatial competition among banks and
study the impact of the dissemination of nancial information and the entry of new banks on
risk-taking. Differently from Cordella and Yeyati (2002), our paper is concerned with bank
competition between countries at different stages of economic development and the impact
of potential capital ight on risk-taking in the emergent countries. The method Cordella and
Yeyati use to model nancial transparency also differs from ours. Similar to Schultz (2004),
we account for transparency by introducing both informed and uninformed investors.
Hyytinen and Takalo (2002) argue that the transparency required by bank regulation
comes at a cost, which in turn can reduce the charter value of banks and increase the fragility
3
of the banking system. Our model shows a similar result but for quite different reasons.
Finally, after calculating a bank disclosure index that was adopted from Baumann and
Nier (2004), we empirically test the impact of nancial openness and disclosure on bank
risk-taking. Our empirical analysis is applied to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)
economies and to Turkey. For these countries, we collected individual nancial data for 258
banks over the period from 2005-2008. Many economies in this region have experienced
nancial liberalization (Crean et al. 2007), and some of them are characterized by a massive
capital ight (Almansour 2008). In line with Nier and Baumann (2006) and Demirgüç Kunt
et al. (2008), our results conrm the negative relationship between transparency and various
risk-taking indicators. In light of our theoretical model, this result indicates that the coun-
tries in our sample are on average characterized by a sufciently high degree of nancial
openness. Moreover, our regressions show that the nancial openness of emerging countries
positively impacts risk-taking.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the behav-
ior toward risk of the banking systems in emerging countries. Empirical evidence on MENA
countries is presented in Section 3.
2 The Model
Consider two countries h and f , where h is the emerging country and f is the developed
one. Each country contains one banking system6. We assume that the emerging country is
not attractive to investors in country h. This assumption appears realistic enough because
weak investor protection prevails in developing countries, as explained above. Therefore,
depositors in the emerging region may decide to invest their savings in the developed country.
The population of investors located in the emerging country is portrayed by a linear seg-
ment [0; 1]. The border of the emerging country is situated at position 1 and the domestic
and foreign banking systems are located on the extremities 0 and 1; respectively. Depositors
are uniformly distributed with density 1 along the linear segment [0; 1]. This spatial repre-
sentation must not be interpreted geographically. It is rather destined to capture the fact that
depositors have idiosyncratic preferences in their attitudes toward foreign investments. More
precisely, the closer the investor of type x (x 2 [0; 1]) is to the origin 0, the more she favors
6Because we focus on international bank competition, we assume that the banking system in each jurisdic-
tion reduces to one bank.
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its home nancial center, but the closer she is to the border, the more willing she becomes to
use cross-border deposits. Consequently, a depositor of type x whose distance to the border
is 1   x incurs a total transaction cost of (1  x) k . The lower the international mobility,
the higher the unit cost k will be. Hence k can be viewed as a measure of the degree of
international nancial openness.
BANKS Banks offer an interest rate ri (i = h; f) to depositors and lend the deposited
funds out to borrowers. Like Chiesa (2001), we assume that lending consists of project
nancing. A bank is presumed to take excessive risks if it does not monitor the funded
project. Because we focus on the potential risk behavior within the emerging country, we
assume, without loss of generality, that banks in the developed country do not take excessive
risks7. More precisely, the bank in h chooses strategy s 2 fm;Mg, where s = m stands
for excessive risk-taking, and s = M indicates safe risk management in the case of
monitoring. We consider that choosing a safe risk management strategyM means complying
with international prudential rules. Banks in both countries are assumed to be risk-indifferent
and have limited liability. If actionm is chosen, one unit of resources is invested in a portfolio
that yields r with probability pm and is zero otherwise. Opting forM delivers a return r with
probability pM , with pM > pm but it also entails a monitoring cost equal to c > 0 (with
r > c) . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the action M eliminates the credit risk,
while the action m does not8, that is pm = p and pM = 1. In the analysis that follows, we
also assume that p 2  1
2
; 1

.
Finally, we consider a deposit insurance scheme that is specic9to each country, in which
a fraction i (i = h; f ) of deposits, 0 < i < 1; is refunded to depositors if a bank fails.
Without loss of generality, we assume f = 1 and let h = . We suppose that implementing
safe risk management is efcient10. This assumption implies that 1 + r > c=(1  p).
TIMING The timing of the model is shown in the following gure.
7This assumption must not be interpreted in absolute terms but in comparison to the behavior of the emerg-
ing banking system.
8This assumption is not equivalent to perfect risk diversication because since risk-mitigation costs are
incurred.
9For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the deposit insurance is funded by non-distorting taxation.
10In other words, the expected net gain induced by sound risk management (1+ r  c) exceeds the expected
net gain induced by excessive risk-taking, p(1 + r)
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Figure 1: Timing of the model
At date 0; the banking sector in country h chooses a strategy s 2 fm;Mg and at date 1;
it states whether it is complying with international prudential standards (choice of s =M ) or
it makes no statement. Banks in developing countries often have substantial implementation
costs for international regulatory standards and resist effective compliance (Walter, 2010)11.
Financial systems in developing countries thus have low capacity to disclose relevant infor-
mation to investors. Wemodel this imperfect transparency by considering like Schultz (2004)
that the investors are composed of informed and uninformed agents. Informed investors rep-
resent a fraction  (0    1). They are endowed with sufciently high expertise allowing
them to exactly perceive the chosen risk strategy by the banking sector. The remaining frac-
tion  (0    1) are uninformed investors. For simplicity, we suppose that these agents
can by no means observe the actual risk behavior (M or m) chosen by the home banking
sector. This lack of observation can be due to their lack of expert knowledge. Indeed, they
think that mock compliance occurs when the banking sector ofcially states compliance with
international standards. Any missing information encourages the uninformed investors to be
prudent and to assume the status quo in risk-taking even if the bank announces compliance.
We also assume that these investors are so unsophisticated that they are unable to extract
valuable information about risk-taking from interest rates. In the sequel, we use the parame-
ter  as a proxy for the degree of nancial transparency, and we assume that the fraction of
informed investors increases with the degree of nancial disclosure.
At date 2, the investors choose where to invest according to their knowledge about the
risk strategy chosen by their home country's banking sector. At date 3, the banking sectors
compete by setting the deposit rates offered to the investors. Finally at date 4 the depositors'
investments materialize. It follows that investors learn the risk strategy chosen by their home
country bank after having deposited their money.
INVESTORS Investors select the country that offers the highest expected return net
of mobility costs. The expected utility of informed investors located at xI ; xI 2 [0; 1] and
11In developing countries, ofcially reporting compliance does not necessarily translate into facts and mock
compliance (Walter, 2010) is very likely to occur. An additional complication is that real compliance is difcult
for outside observers to assess (Walter, 2010). This difculty follows from the lack of skilled accounting and
auditing professionals and the high cost of implementing international accounting and disclosure standards
(United Nations, 2008).
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who invest in their own country h is given by
Uh(xI) =
(
p(1 + rh) + (1  p)  if s = m
1 + rh if s = M
If she invests in country f , her expected utility becomes
Uf (xI) = (1 + rf )  k (1  xI)
The expected utility of the uninformed investor located at xU ; xU 2 [0; 1] who invests in her
own country h is given by
Uh(xU) = p(1 + rh) + (1  p)  if s 2 fm;Mg
If she invests in country f , her expected utility becomes
Uf (xU) = (1 + rf )  k (1  xU)
If the bank in the emerging country chooses strategy M , the marginal informed and unin-
formed investors' locations respectively become
xMI =
rh   rf
k
+ 1
xMU =
p (1 + rh)  (1 + rf ) +  (1  p)
k
+ 1
The market share xM of the bank in country h if the prudent strategy is selected is obtained
by calculating xM = xMI + (1  )xMU which yields
xM =
 (1 + rh)  (1 + rf ) +  (1  )
k
+ 1; (1)
where  =  + (1  )p. If there is perfect transparency, all investors ( = 1) are informed
and if the bank chooses the safe strategyM it follows that  = 1. In case of perfect opacity,
we have  = 0 and consequently  = p.
If there is no compliance reported by the jurisdiction h or if there is mock compliance,
the bank in the emerging country takes excessive risk. The informed and uninformed in-
vestors will choose the destination of their investment consistently, considering the strategy
m adopted by the domestic bank. The deposit supply faced by the bank in country h equals
xm =
p (1 + rh)  (1 + rf ) +  (1  p)
k
+ 1:
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2.1 Excessive risk-taking
Each banking system selects the interest rate that maximizes its own prot taking the rival's
rate as given.
Max
rh
mh = px
m(r   rh)
Max
rf
mf = (1  xm) (r   rf   c):
Solving the system of rst order conditions yields the interest rates rmh and rmf 12
rmh = r  
2k   (1  p)(1 + r   ) + c
3p
(2)
rmf = r   c 
k + (1  p) (1 + r   )  c
3
(3)
The corresponding market share of h is
xmh =
2k   (1  p)(1 + r   ) + c
3k
; (4)
Consequently, the market share for f is xmf = 1   xmh : Because sound risk management is
efcient, we have xmh 2 (0; 1) if and only if
k > k1 =
(1  p)(1 + r   )  c
2
: (5)
The prots of the banks in h and f can be written as
mh = (x
m
h )
2 k
mf = (1  xmh )2 k
2.2 Sound risk management
Under sound risk management, the market share of the bank in the emerging country is
given by (1). Consequently, each bank selects the interest rate that maximizes its own prot
by taking the rival's rate as given.
Max
rh
Mh = x
M (r   rh   c)
Max
rf
Mf =
 
1  xM (r   rf   c)
12The offered interest rates rmi (i = h; f ) are positively signed for a sufciently large r.
8
After solving the system of best replies, we obtain the following interest rates13
rMh = r   c 
2k   (1  ) (1 + r   c  )
3
(6)
rMf = r   c 
k + (1  ) (1 + r   c  )
3
(7)
The corresponding market share of h becomes
xMh =
2k   (1  ) (1 + r      c)
3k
;
which belongs to the interval (0; 1) if and only if k > k2 = (1 )(1+r c )2 .
14
The equilibrium prot functions are given by
Mh =
 
xMh
2 k

;
Mf =
 
1  xMh
2
k:
Notice that decreasing transparency () increases the prot function Mh . The reason for this
increase is that lower transparency softens international bank competition and increases the
captivity of the depositors.
2.3 Choice of risk management strategy
In this section, we study the incentives for the emerging country to comply with safe risk
management. The emerging country choosesM if the difference Mh  mh is positive. The
following proposition may thus be stated.
Proposition 1. A cost threshold (c > 0) exists under which the banking system of country
h adopts safe risk management.
Proof (see Appendix 1.A.)
In other words, the sound strategyM is chosen if the cost of monitoring is not too high,
whereas the banking system opts for risk-takingm if monitoring is too costly. It is important
to note that the threshold value c depends in turn on a set of parameters (see Appendix 1),
which notably are ,  and k. Consider, then, the limit case with no deposit insurance in
13As above, a sufciently large r guarantees that rMi (i = h; f ) are positive.
14The feasibility set of k reduces to k > k = max

k1; k2
	
. Notice that k = k1 if 1+ r   2

c
1 p ;
c
 p

and k = k2 if (1 + r   ) 2

c
 p ;+1

with p   < 1:
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the emerging country ( = 0) and fully disclosed nancial information ( = 1). Then, it
follows that the depositors are able to perfectly discipline the home banking system which
adopts safe risk management.
It is easy to show that @c
@k
> 0 for any , such as  > p > 1=2. We can therefore state the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Increasing nancial openness makes the banking system in the emerging
country more prone to excessive risk-taking.
A higher degree of nancial openness fuels banking competition and puts an upward
pressure on the offered interest rates. Because we have
@rmh@k  > @rMh@k , the bank in the
emerging country is encouraged to mitigate this stronger pressure by switching to a high risk-
taking strategy (m). It also appears that increasing transparency mitigates this effect. This
is in line with the theoretical literature regarding bank competition and risk-taking (Cordella
and Yeyati, 2002).
Let us now investigate the inuence of increased transparency (higher information dis-
closure) on the choice of sound risk management (M ).
Proposition 3. Given sufcient nancial openness, higher disclosure makes the emerging
banking system more likely to opt for sound risk management. In contrast, if capital mobility
is low, higher disclosure decreases the likelihood of sound risk management.
Proof (see Appendix 1.A.)
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3, we rst totally differentiate the equality
Mh (c
; )  mh (c) = 0 with respect to  and c. It can be shown (see Appendix 1.B.) that
dc
d
has the same sign as @
M
h
@
. Analyzing this last term gives
@Mh
@
=
2S
3
xMh (1 + r      c)| {z }
+
+
 
xMh
2  kS
2| {z }
 
;
Thus, increasing transparency has two opposite effects. On the one hand, banks have an
incentive to behave more prudently because higher transparency increases their attractive-
ness to depositors. On the other hand, more transparency spurs bank competition15, which
15Increasing market transparency increases deposit supply elasticity and thus intensies the competition
perceived by the emerging country's bank. Indeed, it is easy to check that @eh@ > 0 with eh =
@xMh
@rh
rh
xMh
. A
similar argument is developed by Schultz (2004) .
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squeezes prot margins and thus leads to more bank risk-taking. Notice that the higher the
mobility cost k, the stronger the prot squeeze will be16. Which effect ultimately dominates
depends on the degree of nancial openness. When the level of nancial openness is high
(k < k), the prot squeeze created by higher transparency (increased ) is dominated by the
attractiveness effect. However, when capital mobility is low (k > k) the opposite occurs.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimated equation and data coverage
In this section, we empirically test how bank risk-taking in emerging economies can be
affected by disclosure (Discl) and nancial openness (Kaopen), giving empirical support to
our results from Propositions 2 and 3. For this purpose, we estimate the following model for
a cross country sample of banks :
Riskik = f(Disclik; Kaopenk; Xik; Xk);
where subscripts i and k refer to bank and country respectively, whileXik andXk are vectors
of control variables at the bank and country-level.
Our data set comprises 258 banks in 12 MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israël, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab
Emirates) and in Turkey. The data used to calculate the bank-level variables are collected
from the Bankscope dataset, over the 2005-2008 period. We distinguish between two sub-
periods, including and not including 2008, which is the rst year of the recent nancial
crisis. All variables except Discl (2007) and Kaopen (2007) are averaged over the periods
under study: 2005-2007 or 2005-2008. We cannot exploit the time-series dimension of our
dataset because of the lack of variability in the disclosure and nancial openness variables.
We therefore conduct our analysis on a cross-sectional basis. Considering a short period
could be viewed as an advantage. Indeed, if it happens that the banks that provide poor
nancial information are the most likely to exit from the sample, it is crucial to shorten the
16This relationship occurs because high prot margins (induced by a high mobility cost) imply larger losses
if transparency increases.
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observed period as much as possible.
3.2 Measuring disclosure
We calculate a Bank Disclosure Index for each bank from the MENA Region, based on a
framework originally proposed by Erlend Nier from the Bank of England (Baumann and
Nier 2004), and later used by Huang (2006) and by Nier and Baumann (2006).
The Disclosure Index aggregates information originating from six categories, including:
(1) Loans; (2) Other earning assets; (3) Deposits (4) Other funding; (5) Memo lines; and (6)
Incomes. A sub-index is created for each category of disclosure. These sub-indices further
contain a total of seventeen items, which are listed in Appendix 1. These items measure the
level of detail provided by the banks regarding seventeen dimensions of accounting informa-
tion in their published accounts and provided by the Bankscope database.
This index is used at the individual bank level. To give a picture of the situation in the
MENA countries, we calculated a national index by averaging the index values of individual
banks in a country, weighted or not by their assets (Figure 1). As expected, in Figure 1, we
obtain a high level of disclosure for Jordan, Israel and some Gulf countries. The calculated
index for the Turkish banking sector appears to be relatively high. This result is consistent
with the decision taken by the Turkish authorities, in the wake of the massive banking cri-
sis in 2001, to commit to regulation reforms by introducing a more severe control system
augmented by stricter rules (Cimenoglu et al. 2009). In contrast, the Algerian and Syrian
banking systems show very low disclosure indexes.
Figure 2: Disclosure Index (2007)
3.3 Bank risk-taking variables
We use three different measures for bank risk-taking, or, inversely, bank soundness.
These measures are calculated from bank balance sheet data provided by Bankscope: a liq-
uidity index, a leverage ratio and a z-score. Although these variables are imperfect indicators
of risk-taking, they are widely employed in the empirical literature. Moreover, in the light of
the recent nancial crisis, liquidity and leverage ratios are viewed as key indicators for bank
risk-taking by reports of regulators. Regulators recommend that liquidity and leverage ratios
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should be introduced to supplement the existing regulatory parameters (FSA, 2009, BCBS
2009).
The liquidity ratio is measured by calculating liquid assets against to total assets. Gen-
erally, banks with higher ratios are perceived as being safer because of the risk-mitigating
character of liquid assets, which allow the bank to meet unexpected withdrawals. Demirgüc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2004, p. 383) consider liquidity to be one of the most reliable accounting
measures of bank risk, in particular for the developing countries. Equity and prot ratios are
more subject to accounting manipulation and tend to be overstated at weaker banks.
The leverage indicator is expressed as the ratio of total assets to total book equity capital.
Banks typically increase their risk-taking by borrowing to acquire more assets, with the goal
of raising their return on equity. According to the Turner Report (FSA, 2009, p. 67), using
this leverage ratio in addition to liquidity is very important. Indeed, the crisis revealed that
assets that are believed to be of a low risk type can become highly illiquid and risky when
systemic problems emerge.
The z-score represents a universal measure of soundness in banking-related studies. This
index inversely proxies the probability of banks' failure. The merit of this index is that it
combines protability, solvability and volatility in a relatively simple measure that is based
solely on accounting information. This index is dened as:
Zi =
ROAi+E=TAi
ROAi
;where ROAi is the period-average return on assets for bank i, E=TAi
stands for the period average equity to total assets, and ROAi represents the standard de-
viation of ROA that captures the volatility of returns. The z-score increases with higher
protability and capitalization levels and decreases with higher return volatility. Larger val-
ues for the z-score imply lower risk-taking and, thus, greater bank soundness.
3.4 Financial openness and control variables
Tomeasure nancial openness, which is a key variable of our theoretical model, only country-
level variables are available. We use the Kaopen index which is widely used in nancial in-
tegration studies. This proxy for openness in capital transactions, developed by Chin and Ito
(2002, 2006) aims to measure the extent of capital controls based on the information from the
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
The Kaopen index is based on binary variables that indicate restrictions on current ac-
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count and capital account transactions. The index also takes into account the presence of
multiple exchange rates and the requirement for the surrender of export proceeds. This index
takes on higher values when the country is more open to cross-border capital transactions.
A new statistical series for the Kaopen index is provided by Chinn and Ito (2007) for 182
countries, updated until 2007.
To isolate the impact of disclosure and nancial openness on bank risk-taking (or sound-
ness), we use a number of bank-level and country-level control variables. Empirical literature
on bank risk-taking always controls for bank size, which is proxied by the natural logarithm
of total assets. As noted by Gonzalez (2005), the effect of the bank size is not easy to forecast
because under a "too big to fail" behavior, larger banks can have a greater incentives to take
risks than smaller banks. However, larger banks also have a greater potential to diversify
and reduce their risk-taking attitude. As a complement to the bank size, we use the variable
"share" dened as the contribution of each bank to the total assets in the banking sector of
each country. Following Berger et al. (2009), we control for the asset composition of banks.
The indicators are the share of total loans in total assets and the ratio of xed assets to
total assets. These indicators control for the difference in the structure of bank business.
Traditionally, the public ownership of a bank is captured by a dummy variable that is set to
1 when government's ownership exceeds 50%.
To take into account the macroeconomic environment at the country-level, we control for
the degree of economic development using the real GDP per capita, the real GDP growth and
the ination rate. Finally, in the MENA region, some economies are strongly resource-based
(oil and gas exporters). For this reason, we introduce the dummy variable "res" that takes
the value 1 for oil or gas exporters. The bank and country-level variables that are used in
our empirical analysis are summarized in Table 1. The descriptive statistics for bank-level
variables and the correlations among variables are shown in Appendix 2.
Table 1: Variables denitions and data sources
3.5 Results
Table 2 presents the results for our main regressions. All of the results are estimated using
OLS, and standard errors are adjusted by the White method because of heteroskedasticity.
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In these equations, we regress risk-taking indicators (leverage) or soundness indicators (Liq-
uidity and z-score) against nancial openness, disclosure and control variables.
In a nutshell, these regressions yield signicant results with signs that are consistent with
our theoretical model. We obtain more precise coefcients for the liquidity and leverage
equations than for the z-score.
In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variables are measured over the 2005-2007 period.
In columns (2) and (4) we repeat the same estimation by including 2008, which is the rst
year of the recent nancial crisis. It appears that in both estimations the results are very
close.
In line with Proposition 2, we nd that the nancial openness proxy (KAOPEN) affects
liquidity (the soundness indicator) negatively and leverage (the risk indicator) positively. The
nancial openness variable is not signicant in the z-score regression.
There is clear evidence that the disclosure index (in log) inuences the liquidity and
z-score positively, and leverage negatively. These very signicant results in all of our regres-
sions are consistent with Proposition 3, according to which more disclosure increases the
likeliness that the banking system opts for sound risk management in the case of sufcient
nancial openness.
Regarding the bank specic control variables, we nd that a larger bank size (log of total
bank assets) is associated with relatively higher risk-taking and lower soundness. This evi-
dence conrms the results obtained by the empirical literature on bank risk-taking. However,
the banks'share in the total assets of their home (banking) sector is signicant and negative
only in the liquidity regression. The bank soundness, measured by liquidity, appears to be
affected by the structure of their balance sheet (share of total loans in total assets). Berger et
al. (2009) recently obtained a similar relationship.
Among the country-level characteristics, the dummy variable RES (oil and gas exporters)
is signicant in explaining bank soundness and bank risk-taking, which are respectively cap-
tured by liquidity and leverage, respectively. The annual GDP growth affects liquidity pos-
itively and leverage negatively. In addition, we nd that a higher per capita GDP is only
consistent with lower liquidity.
Table 2: OLS Regressions
To check for robustness, we next test whether the previous results change with the other
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specications. Our regressions might not account for all of the country aspects of the bank
environment. Indeed, the explanatory power of bank level variables, such as the disclosure
indicator we use, could come from country specic differences (Nier and Baumann, 2006).
To check whether we control for all differences across countries, we replace the country
variables with dummies. The introduction of country xed effects (Table A4 in Appendix 2)
conrms our initial results, in particular for liquidity and leverage indicators, but makes the
impact of disclosure on the z-score index less signicant.
As a second robustness test, we once again estimate all of our specications by succes-
sively excluding one country after the other. In Table A5 in Appendix 2 we highlight the
regressions for which the variable Diclosure (DISCL) exhibits the largest standard error.
In other words, we report the worst of the fourteen tested equations for each specication.
In every case, the exclusion of Turkey, which contains the largest number of banks in our
sample, slightly weakens the signicance of the disclosure effect.
These tests show that our results are particularly robust especially concerning the liquid-
ity ratio and the leverage indicator, but to a lesser extend. After controlling for robustness,
the disclosure indicator still remains a signicant determinant of banks' soundness. We,
however, observe the fragility of our z-score regression, which is not a very surprising result
given the lack of temporal data.
Potential endogeneity problems can affect the measured impact of disclosure on risk-
taking variables. For example, a bank's decision to disclose limited information could be
explained by the desire to hide high risk-taking behavior. More precisely, an inverse causal-
ity between risk-taking and disclosure could be suspected. Nier and Baumann (2006, p.
344) consider that the endogeneity bias for disclosure variables is less plausible in a cross-
sectional setup. Nevertheless, we address this potential problem with instrumental variables
estimations (Two stages least squares) that are adapted to the existence of heteroskedastic-
ity. The choice of instruments is, however, relatively limited in a cross-sectional analysis.
We tested many bank level variables, including public ownership and foreign ownership, and
country level governance variables, which can be correlated with our disclosure variable. The
only signicant instrument that we found is public ownership. In the literature of corporate
governance as applied to banks in developing countries there is evidence for a positive rela-
tionship between the public ownership status and disclosure. For instance, Arun and Turner
(2004, p. 374) consider that one reason for government ownership is the severe informa-
tion problems inherent in developing nancial systems. Using only one instrument, however,
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does not allow the validity of instruments to be asserted through an overidentication test.
Nevertheless, public ownership does not appear to be signicant in the econometric works
analyzing the bank risk-taking (Angkinand and Wihlborg 2010, Berger et al 2009, Gonzales
2005, Barth et al 2004). In all of our IV regressions, we use the Stock and Yogo test to verify
that there is no concern regarding weak instruments. We show that the Cragg-Donald and
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics are above 10 and exceed the tabulated value.
Table 3: Instrumental Variables Regressions (2SLS)
4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze how international competition for deposits and infor-
mation disclosure affects banks' risk-taking behavior in emerging countries. The model we
develop is also tested econometrically using data on MENA countries.
Briey, we build a model that examines the levels of nancial openness and disclosure
of information and indicates for which of these levels implementing international regulatory
standards in developing and emerging countries is a winning strategy. One of our main re-
sults is that increasing nancial openness also increases the likelihood of the emerging bank-
ing center's compliance with safe risk management. It appears that the effect of information
disclosure on risk-taking is ambiguous. On the one hand, greater nancial transparency in-
creases the attractiveness of deposits and motivates banks to behave more prudently. On the
other hand, greater disclosure spurs bank competition and squeezes prot margins. The rst
effect outweighs the second effect only if the level of nancial openness is sufciently high.
From a policy analysis viewpoint, this result implies that promoting successful nancial dis-
closure in an emerging country requires sufcient nancial openness.
Our empirical analysis is based on a disclosure index computed at the bank level. Af-
ter controlling for bank- and country-level characteristics, we test the impact of nancial
openness and disclosure on several risk-taking variables. The risk indicators were chosen
for their relevance during the recent nancial crisis. The MENA region plus Turkey is not
perfectly homogenous, but many of these economies can be considered emerging and are
characterized by massive capital ight. The regressions yield results that are consistent with
our theoretical propositions. We nd a signicant negative relationship between the proxy
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for nancial openness and the risk-taking indicators. There is also clear evidence that disclo-
sure positively impacts the soundness indicators. Finally, instrumental variable regressions
conrm these results.
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5 Appendix 1: The model
5.0.1 Appendix 1.A. Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The threshold-value c = 2k (1 )(1+r ) 
p
(2k (1 p)(1+r ))
(+
p
 1) is
derived from the equality kS

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
2
  (xmh )2

= 0. It follows that c > 0 if k >
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
: If   (+
p
 1)p

> p holds, we have ~k < 0. In this case it follows that for any
value of the net return 1 + r    we get c > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3: Calculating the derivative of the threshold cost c with respect
to  and with respect to  yields @c
@
> 0 if max
n
k; ~k
o
< k < k. Since we assume that
p 2  1
2
; 1

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
k1; k2
	
and k > ~k. And @c
@
< 0 if k > k
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)
2(2
p
 ) . We can thus state the following proposition.
5.0.2 Appendix 1.B.
After having totally differentiated the equality Mh (c; )   mh (c) = 0 with respect to 
and c, we obtain dc
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=
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
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@Mh
@
.
6 Appendix 2: Empirical analysis
The bank disclosure indexes measure the level of detail that banks provide on seventeen di-
mensions of accounting information in their published accounts and provided by Bankscope
database (Method of Baumann and Nier 2004). For all indexes, zero was assigned if there
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was no entry in any of the corresponding categories and 1 otherwise, except for the index
for securities by type and the capital index. For the securities by type item, a 0 was
assigned if there was no entry for any of the associated disclosure categories, a 1 if there was
only an entry for the coarse breakdown and a 2 if there was an entry for the detailed break-
down. For the capital item, a 0 was assigned if there was no entry in any of the categories,
a 1 if there was one entry only, a 2 if there were two entries and a 3 if there were three or
four entries. Aggregating the information scores on the 17 disclosure items, the composite
index can be created with the following formula: Discl = 1
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17P
i=1
si
Subindex Categories:
1.Loans:
S1: Loans by maturity: Less than three months, three to six months, six months to one
year, one to ve years, more than ve years
S2: Loans by type: Loans to municipalities/government, mortgages, HP/lease, other
loans
S3: Loans by counterpart: Loans to group companies, loans to other corporates, loans to
banks
S4: Problem loans: Total problem loans
S5: Problem loans by type: Overdue/restructured/other nonperforming
2.Other earning assets:
S6: Securities by type: Detailed breakdown: Treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs,
equity investments, other investments Coarse breakdown: government securities, other listed
securities, non listed securities
S7: Securities by holding purpose:Investment securities, trading securities
3. Liabilities Deposits:
S8: Deposits by maturity: Demand, savings, less than three months, three to six months,
six months to one year, one to ve years, more than ve years
S9: Deposits by type of customer: Bank deposits, municipal/government
4. Other funding:
S10: Money market funding: Total money market funding
20
S11: Long-term funding: Convertible bonds, mortgage bonds, other bonds, subordinated
debt, hybrid capital
5. Memo lines:
S12: Reserves: Loan loss reserves (memo)
S13: Capital: Total capital ratio, tier 1 ratio, total capital, tier 1 capital
S14: Contingent liabilities: Total contingent liabilities
S15: Off-balance-sheet items: Off-balance-sheet items
6. Income statement:
S16: Non interest income: Net commission income, net fee income, net trading income
S17: Loan loss provisions: Loan loss provisions
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Table A1: Summary Statistics
Table A2: Number of banks included in the sample
Table A3: Correlation matrix of main explanatory variables
Table A4: OLS regressions with country dummies
Table A5: OLS regressions dropping countries one by one
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Figure 1: Timing of the model 
 
 
Figure 2: Disclosure index 
 
 
 
Table 1: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
LIQUID_TA Liquid asset to total asset; values averaged over 2005-2007 and 
2005-2008  
Bankscope 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total assets to total book equity capital, average over 2005-
2007 and 2005-2008. 
Bankscope 
Z-SCORE Average return on assets (ROA) plus equity-asset ratio, divided by 
the standard deviation of ROA. To calculate σROA, we use data from 
the six previous years  (2003-2008) 
Bankscope 
DISCL Disclosure index, as defined by Baumann and Nier 2004, see 
description in main text, year 2007 
Bankscope 
KAOPEN Proxy of openness degree in capital account transactions developed 
by Chinn and Ito (2002 and 2006), year 2007. 
Chinn and Ito 
(2007) 
SIZE Natural logarithm of value of bank total assets, average over 2005-
2007. 
Bankscope 
SHARE Contribution of each bank to the total assets in the banking sector of 
each country, average over 2005-2007 
Bankscope 
LOANS Loans to total assets ratio, average over 2005-2007 Bankscope 
FIXEDASSET Fixed assets to total assets ratio, average over 2005-2007 Bankscope 
PUBLIC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when government exceed 
50% of total bank ownership and takes 0 otherwise. 
Bankscope 
GDPCAP GDP per capital of each country, average over 2005-2007. WB 
GDPGR0507 GDP growth rate of each country, average over 2005-2007. WB 
GDPGR0007 GDP growth rate of each country, average over 2000-2007. WB 
INFLATION Inflation rate of each country, average over 2005-2007. WB 
RES Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for oil or gas exporter 
country. 
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Table 2: OLS Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LIQUID_TA LIQUID_TA0508 LEVERAGE LEVERAGE0508 Z-SCORE 
      
DISCL 0.0705*** 0.0624*** -2.945** -3.101** 0.352** 
 (0.0237) (0.0236) (1.360) (1.296) (0.156) 
KAOPEN -0.00877** -0.00819* 0.772*** 0.699*** 0.0295 
 (0.00432) (0.00430) (0.210) (0.203) (0.0308) 
SIZE -0.0474*** -0.0439*** 0.920*** 1.004*** 2.911 
 (0.00673) (0.00623) (0.324) (0.317) (2.618) 
SHARE 0.462*** 0.449*** 9.772 7.699 1.360** 
 (0.0955) (0.0897) (7.110) (6.875) (0.672) 
LOANS -0.666*** -0.626*** 1.096 0.681 -2.802 
 (0.0445) (0.0458) (2.096) (1.935) (2.567) 
GDPGR0507 0.0159*** 0.0153***    
 (0.00526) (0.00518)    
RESS 0.0491** 0.0497** -4.284*** -3.506** 0.0760 
 (0.0210) (0.0214) (1.371) (1.393) (0.126) 
GDPCAP -1.45e-06** -1.81e-06*** 3.01e-05 2.09e-05 -1.65e-06 
 (7.22e-07) (6.97e-07) (4.49e-05) (4.29e-05) (5.01e-06) 
GDPGR0007   -1.621*** -1.566*** 0.0581 
   (0.363) (0.337) (0.0417) 
Constant 0.917*** 0.878*** 16.22*** 15.72*** -0.551 
 (0.0877) (0.0890) (5.004) (4.910) (0.681) 
      
Observations 238 238 205 207 166 
R-squared 0.700 0.691 0.369 0.358 0.131 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Instrumental Variables Regressions (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LIQUID_TA LIQUID_TA0508 LEVERAGE LEVERAGE0508 Z-SCORE 
      
LNDISCL 0.198* 0.114 -11.10** -10.67** 0.250 
 (0.105) (0.0961) (4.838) (4.658) (0.429) 
KAOPEN -0.0122** -0.00959* 1.018*** 0.938*** 0.0361 
 (0.00532) (0.00503) (0.283) (0.275) (0.0350) 
SIZE -0.0635*** -0.0504*** 2.073*** 2.063*** 2.565 
 (0.0144) (0.0135) (0.729) (0.713) (2.447) 
SHARE 0.601*** 0.505*** 0.174 -1.147 1.517** 
 (0.170) (0.142) (8.665) (8.710) (0.734) 
LOANS -0.684*** -0.633*** 3.214 2.540 -2.361 
 (0.0475) (0.0459) (3.050) (2.782) (2.386) 
GDPGR0507 0.0125** 0.0139**    
 (0.00617) (0.00581)    
RESS 0.0554** 0.0522** -4.670*** -3.927*** 0.0519 
 (0.0237) (0.0222) (1.400) (1.370) (0.144) 
GDPCAP -1.72e-06** -1.92e-06*** 3.80e-05 3.05e-05 -1.48e-06 
 (8.08e-07) (7.28e-07) (4.74e-05) (4.43e-05) (5.29e-06) 
GDPGR0007   -1.360*** -1.325*** 0.0567 
   (0.444) (0.417) (0.0409) 
Constant 0.651*** 0.771*** 31.02*** 29.62*** -0.176 
 (0.232) (0.209) (10.53) (10.10) (1.729) 
      
Observations 238 238 205 207 173 
R-squared 0.659 0.684 0.173 0.177 0.136 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LIQUID_TA 238 .3248649 .1954829 .000601 .9628144 
LIQUID_TA0508 250 .3176826 .1900415 .000601 .9608909 
LEVERAGE 215 46.76851 527.0663 1.094968 7737.987 
LEVERAGE0508 217 46.41075 524.6199 1.101905 7737.987 
ZSCORE 168 3.996603 3.481365 .0615685 21.80216 
DISCL 238 62.42497 18.06581 4.761905 95.2381 
SIZE 238 14.26853 1.747947 8.545911 17.76788 
SHARE 238 .0519788 .0846086 0 .7403478 
LOANS 238 .4612948 .2219005 0 .9892076 
FIXEDASSETS 236 .0098002 .0201764 0 .2383549 
      
PUBLIC 238 .4663866 .4999202 0 1 
 
 
Table A2: Number of banks included in the sample 
Countries Number of banks 
Algeria 14 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 28 
Israel 14 
Jordan 15 
Lebanon 38 
Morocco 14 
Oman 8 
Qatar 11 
Saudi Arabia 13 
Syrian Arab Republic 12 
Tunisia 17 
Turkey 46 
United Arab Emirates 28 
 258 
 
 
Table A3: Correlation matrix of main explanatory variables 
 DISCL SIZE SHARE LOANS PUBLIC  GDPGR 
0507 
GDPGR 
0007 
GDPCAP RESS KAOPEN 
DISCL 1.0000           
SIZE 0.5680* 1.0000          
SHARE 0.1321 0.5614* 1.0000         
LOANS 0.2973* 0.2508* 0.0678 1.0000        
PUBLIC 0.4958* 0.4073* 0.1948* 0.3739* 1.0000      
GDPGR0507 0.3490* 0.1243 -0.0300 0.3360* 0.3128*   1.0000      
GDPGR0007 0.2713* 0.0650 -0.0048 0.2864* 0.3070*   0.9128*   1.0000    
GDPCAP 0.3497* 0.1974* 0.0913 0.2659* 0.3192*   0.5524*   0.7122* 1.0000    
RESS 0.1720* 0.1408 0.1679* 0.2698* 0.2201*   0.2263*   0.3936* 0.6835* 1.0000   
KAOPEN 0.2761* 0.1267 0.0113 0.0478 0.0482    0.2791*   0.2653* 0.4322* 0.3152* 1.0000 
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Table A4: OLS regressions with country dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LIQUID_TA LIQUID_TA0508 LEVERAGE LEVERAGE0508 ZSCORE
      
DISCL 0.0776*** 0.0755*** -3.323* -3.212* 0.293 
 (0.0193) (0.0187) (1.906) (1.807) (0.221) 
SIZE -0.0428*** -0.0411*** 1.323*** 1.391*** 4.834* 
 (0.00711) (0.00662) (0.482) (0.450) (2.495) 
SHARE 0.329*** 0.340*** 3.210 0.486 1.348* 
 (0.0919) (0.0974) (7.841) (7.119) (0.752) 
LOANS -0.680*** -0.646*** 4.369 4.163 -4.607* 
 (0.0519) (0.0550) (3.489) (3.382) (2.438) 
Constant 0.910*** 0.869*** 3.775 -2.791 -1.215 
 (0.0949) (0.100) (6.493) (7.611) (0.892) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 238 238 207 209 166 
R-squared 0.747 0.730 0.334 0.358 0.262 
 Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5: OLS regressions dropping countries one by onea  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LIQUID_TA LIQUID_TA0508 LEVERAGE LEVERAGE0508 ZSCORE 
      
DISCL 0.0721** 0.0606* -3.785* -3.328* 0.165 
 (0.0309) (0.0324) (2.225) (1.844) (0.203) 
KAOPEN -0.0277*** -0.0260*** -0.117 -0.171 0.0594 
 (0.00624) (0.00607) (0.591) (0.492) (0.0494) 
SIZE -0.0349*** -0.0292*** 1.871** 1.786*** 1.722 
 (0.00819) (0.00697) (0.763) (0.633) (3.265) 
SHARE 0.300*** 0.274*** -2.095 -2.590 1.374* 
 (0.0982) (0.0847) (10.16) (8.797) (0.740) 
LOANS -0.711*** -0.669*** -0.142 -0.343 -1.704 
 (0.0485) (0.0514) (3.431) (2.838) (3.223) 
GDPGR0507 0.0281*** 0.0267***    
 (0.00611) (0.00595)    
RESS 0.0344 0.0365* -5.873*** -5.029*** 0.112 
 (0.0211) (0.0213) (1.685) (1.576) (0.134) 
GDPCAP -1.37e-06* -1.78e-06** 4.37e-05 3.47e-05 -1.02e-06 
 (7.30e-07) (7.01e-07) (5.10e-05) (4.64e-05) (5.15e-06) 
GDPGR0007   -1.292** -1.226** 0.0504 
   (0.549) (0.473) (0.0443) 
Constant 0.729*** 0.676*** 7.998 7.001 0.240 
 (0.112) (0.112) (8.739) (7.578) (0.860) 
      
Observations 197 197 173 175 144 
R-squared 0.725 0.717 0.219 0.244 0.119 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Regression with the largest standard error for the variable “Disclosure” (DISCL) 
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